FOI Software by Palantir Technologies (0745-2022/23)

Request

I'm writing to you under the Freedom of Information Act (2000) to ask that you please disclose to me if your constabulary has, at any point in the last 5 years, purchased or trialled software by Palantir Technologies, either direct from the government or crown commercial services, or via a third party entity (for instance, Capgemini).

 

Response

Extent and Result of Searches to Locate Information

To locate the information relevant to your request searches were conducted within North Yorkshire Police.

I can confirm that the information you have requested is held by North Yorkshire Police. 

Decision

I have today decided to exempt any information in relation to your request pursuant Section 24(2) National Security and Section 31 (3) Law Enforcement of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

Section 24 – National Security

Section 24 is a prejudice-based qualified exemption and there is a requirement to articulate the harm as well as carrying out a public interest test.

Section 31 – Law Enforcement

Section 31 is a prejudice-based qualified exemption and there is a requirement to articulate the harm as well as carrying out a public interest test.

Evidence of Harm

Any disclosure under FOI is a release to the public at large.  Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, confirming or denying that any other information relating to the covert software and its uses would show criminals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the force are, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal/terrorist activities.  Confirming or denying the specific circumstances in which the Police Service may or may not deploy the use of covert software would lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement.  This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.  

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored.  It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable.  Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat is currently categorised as SUBSTANTIAL. 

The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists.  It is well established that police forces use covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour.  It has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.   

Confirming or denying whether any information is or isn’t held relating to the covert software offered by specific companies would limit operational capabilities as criminals/terrorists would gain a greater understanding of the police’s methods and techniques, enabling offenders to take steps to counter them.  It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities.  This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies.  In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where the use of certain tactics are or are not deployed.  This can be useful information to those committing crimes. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.  

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations.  Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.

Factors favouring disclosure under Section 31 & Section 24

Releasing information would provide an insight into the police resources and enable the public to have a better understanding of the effectiveness of the police.

It would show how public funds are being spent in relation to protecting the public.

Information would ensure transparency and accountability and enable the public to see what tactics are deployed by the Police Service to tackle/assist in fighting crime.

Factors against disclosure under Section 31 & Section 24

It has been recorded that FOIA releases are monitored by criminals and terrorists and so releasing information held would undermine and compromise law enforcement and it would also hinder any local, regional or national operations.

It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects that can assist criminal planning and that any nation’s security arrangements, by releasing the information, may reveal the relative vulnerability of what we may be trying to protect.

The Police Service would not wish to reveal resource information that would undermine the law enforcement operations and would impact on police resources, as more crime would be committed because criminals/terrorists would know which forces had less/more capability. This in turn would place the public at a greater risk and a fear of crime would be realised, especially for more vulnerable areas.

Balance test

The security of the public and the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge the resources, if to do so would place the safety of individuals at risk, due to providing freely available (single point) information under such requests and which in turn would undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement.

Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing resources and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately prepared and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police resources and operations in the highly sensitive areas such as extremism, crime prevention, public disorder and terrorism prevention.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. It is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for exempting your request for planning information is not made out.

Pursuant to Section 17(1) of the Act this letter acts as a Refusal Notice in response to part of your request.

Please note that systems used for recording information are not generic, nor are the procedures used locally in capturing the data.  It should be noted therefore that this force’s response to your questions should not be used for comparison purposes with any other responses you may receive.