FOI - Fleet List (0123-2022/23)

Request

I would like to request an up-to date fleet list as of the date 13/05/2022 In this, please include:

Make

Model

Registration Plates

Marked or Unmarked

 

Response

Extent and Result of Searches to Locate Information

To locate the information relevant to your request searches were conducted within North Yorkshire Police. I can confirm that the information you have requested is held by North Yorkshire Police.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose the located information to you.

Please find below the list of vehicles by make and model for marked vehicles.

I am exempting details of any vehicles used in a specialist capacity along with the registration of the vehicles, pursuant to section 31(1)(a) Law Enforcement. Please see the exemption explanation below.

 

Marked
Make/Model	Count of Make
BMW	17
330	8
R1150	1
R1200	1
RT1200	7
FORD	112
KUGA	15
MONDEO	9
RANGER	12
TRANSIT	76
HONDA	2
CRF	2
IVECO	3
DAILY	3
MERCEDES	7
SPRINTER	7
PEUGEOT	80
308	29
BOXER	2
EXPERT	28
PARTNER	21
VAUXHALL	26
ANTARA	2
ASTRA	4
COMBO	1
MOVANO	4
VIVARO	15
VOLKSWAGEN	2
CARAVELLE	2
VOLVO	6
XC90	6
Total	255

 

Please find below the list of vehicles by make and model for unmarked vehicles.

 

Make/Model	Count of Make
PEUGEOT	19
208	12
308	6
5008	1
Total	19

 

Exemption Explanation

 

Section 31 – Law Enforcement

Section 31 is a prejudice-based qualified exemption and there is a requirement to articulate the harm as well as carrying out a public interest test.  

Evidence of Harm

As you may be aware, disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, releasing any information relating to specialist vehicles and full registrations of policing vehicles, into an open forum, would provide criminals/terrorists with a single point of collective data that was available for them to use.  This can be through targeting specific police vehicles, avoiding vehicles to prevent them for being detected and also to clone registration numbers, against the make and models of vehicles.  This availability of data then increases the vulnerability to the public from those with criminal intent.

Although it is seen that some policing procedures should be transparent and that the requested information may appear harmless, it is still readily available data held within the public domain that can be accessed and used by known criminals/terrorist.  As the threat from terrorism cannot be ignored, it is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The Police are there to support the public and deliver effective law enforcement, therefore any data that would compromise policing operations would be detrimental in providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.

There is also a duty of care to individuals when police have to attend addresses.  In providing a full list of fleet vehicles/VRMS, via FOI requests, the public then have access through open forums, such as Google, to look up VRMs, if parked outside an individuals home, and see whether it is associated to the police, which then allows them to know that the individual is liaising with the police.  This can put their safety at risk, especially if they are a victim and neighbours / offenders are not aware that they are liaising with police.

Information that undermines the operational integrity of the police will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national security and law enforcement.  Therefore, it has been determined that the release of all the information requested would not be in the public interest.

Factors favouring disclosure under Section 31

Releasing information held relating to specialist vehicles and unmarked vehicles would provide an insight into the police resources and enable the public to have a better understanding of the effectiveness of the police.

Some registrations are already within the public domain, however not in a collective format.

Information would ensure transparency and accountability and enable the public to see what tactics are deployed by the Police Service to tackle/assist in fighting crime.

Factors against disclosure under Section 31

It has been recorded that FOIA releases are monitored by criminals and terrorists and so releasing full lists of registrations, along with the make and model of the vehicles would provide valuable information, to those with criminal intent, to clone relevant police vehicles putting the public at risk.

Releasing information held relating specialist and unmarked vehicles, would undermine and compromise law enforcement which would also hinder any local, regional or national operations. 

It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects that can assist criminal planning and that of any nation's security arrangements.  The Police Service would not wish to reveal resource information that would undermine the law enforcement operations and would impact on police resources, as more crime would be committed because criminals/terrorists would know which forces had less/more capability, or which vehicles to avoid.  This in turn would place the public at a greater risk and a fear of crime would be realised, especially for more vulnerable areas. 

Balance test

The security of the public and the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge the resources, if to do so would place the safety of individuals at risk, due to providing freely available (single point) information under such requests and which in turn would undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement. 

Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing resources and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately prepared and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police resources and operations in the highly sensitive areas such as extremism, crime prevention, public disorder and terrorism prevention.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. It is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for exempting your request for planning information is not made out.

Pursuant to Section 17(1) of the Act this letter acts as a Refusal Notice in response to your request

Please note that systems used for recording information are not generic, nor are the procedures used locally in capturing the data.  It should be noted therefore that this force’s response to your questions should not be used for comparison purposes with any other responses you may receive.