FOI NYP Force Structure (0569-2022/23)

Request

I would like to establish the following:

Q1. The structure of your detective departments, and the specific detective specialisms within your force (i.e. identifying the specific departments, such as CID, Rape and Serious Sexual Offences teams, Child-Protection units, Surveillance, Organised Crime and so forth).

Q2. The remit of each of these units.

Q3. The logistical structure of your detective departments, including whether they are, for example, regionally based, local to each police station, or centralized.

Q4. How detectives are recruited within each (i.e. internally by recruiting uniformed constables, graduate recruitment, or externally via organisations such as Police Now). 

Response

Extent and Result of Searches to Locate Information

To locate the information relevant to your request searches were conducted within North Yorkshire Police. I can confirm that the information you have requested is held by North Yorkshire Police.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose the located information to you.

Q1 & 2.

• CID/Safeguarding – Serious and complex crime including adult and child Safeguarding investigations
• Investigation Hubs – reactive volume crime and domestic abuse.
• Safeguarding – Multi Agency Safeguarding Teams/Vulnerability Assessment Team. Initial triage/risk assessment.
• Online abuse teams – abusive images of children.
• Organised Crime Unit – Organised criminality including Drugs, County Lines, trafficking
• Expedite Team – (part Detectives) proactive team dealing priority crime such as with drugs, county lines, burglary.
• Economic Crime Unit – Serious and complex fraud and money laundering
• Major Investigation Team (MIT) – includes Murder/Manslaughter/Stranger rape

Q3. CID, Safeguarding, Investigation Hubs, Online Abuse & Economic Crime teams are based in Scarborough, York, Harrogate and Northallerton – Local

I am exempting the location of any other specialised department pursuant section 31 of the Freedom of Information Act. Please see exemption explanation below.

The MASH and VAT are in Northallerton and York respectively - Local

The MIT are in Harrogate and York - Local

Q4. We recruit Detectives internally via uniform officers applying to become a Detective via the national route starting with a National Investigators Examination (NIE) followed by an investigative course and portfolio accreditation ( approx. 2 years). Once accredited they usually remain in the Hub or CID initially and can apply for any other Detective role if they wish.

We have a Detective Academy to identify talent at the earliest opportunity to attract officers into Crime departments.

We are in the recruitment stages of a Detective Accelerated Pathway which will mean new recruits will be in uniform for approximately 9 months before staring in the Investigation Hub or CID and then become a Detective within 2 years. We also have regular transferee campaigns where qualified Detectives transfer from other Forces.

Exemption Explanation

Section 31 – Law Enforcement

Section 31 is a prejudice-based qualified exemption and there is a requirement to articulate the harm as well as carrying out a public interest test.

Evidence of Harm

As you may be aware, disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, releasing any information held regarding the location of specialist departments such as the Organised Crime Unit, it would allow criminals to note what capacity and tactical capabilities the force had, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal/terrorist activities. This would lead to an increase in harm of attacks and compromise Law Enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Releasing information on specialised departments would hinder operational capabilities as criminals/terrorists would gain a greater understanding of the police’s resources, enabling them to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in across the county, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities. This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies.

Information that undermines the operational integrity of the police will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national security and law enforcement.

Factors favouring disclosure under Section 31

Releasing information held relating to specialist departments and the locations of such would provide an insight into the police resources and enable the public to have a better understanding of the effectiveness of the police.

It would show how public funds are being spent in relation to protecting the public.

Information would ensure transparency and accountability and enable the public to see what tactics are deployed by the Police Service to tackle/assist in fighting crime.

Factors against disclosure under Section 31

It has been recorded that FOIA releases are monitored by criminals and terrorists and so releasing information held relating to specialist departments would undermine and compromise law enforcement and it would also hinder any local, regional or national operations.

It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects that can assist criminal planning and that any nation’s security arrangements, by releasing the information, may reveal the relative vulnerability of what we may be trying to protect.

The Police Service would not wish to reveal resource information that would undermine the law enforcement operations and would impact on police resources, as more crime would be committed because criminals/terrorists would know which forces had less/more capability. This in turn would place the public at a greater risk and a fear of crime would be realised, especially for more vulnerable areas.

Balance test

The security of the public and the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge the resources, if to do so would place the safety of individuals at risk, due to providing freely available (single point) information under such requests and which in turn would undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement.

Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing resources and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately prepared and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police resources and operations in the highly sensitive areas such as extremism, crime prevention, public disorder and terrorism prevention.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. It is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for exempting your request for planning information is not made out.

Pursuant to Section 17(1) of the Act this letter acts as a Refusal Notice in response to part of your request.

Please note that systems used for recording information are not generic, nor are the procedures used locally in capturing the data.  It should be noted therefore that this force’s response to your questions should not be used for comparison purposes with any other responses you may receive.