FOI 0120-2026/27- 3D printers

Request:

Q1. How many cases have involved 3D printers in each of the last 4 years? 

Q2. How many of these led to a conviction? 

Q3. How many instances of 3D printers being used to create illegal weapons, or parts for illegal weapons, have been investigated in each of the last 4 years? 

Q4. How many of these led to a conviction? 

Response: 

xtent and Result of Searches to Locate Information 

To locate the information relevant to your request searches were conducted within North Yorkshire Police.  

Decision 

Q1 & Q2. In response to the first question, the request asks how many cases have involved 3D printers in each of the last four years. Although the request is not offence‑specific, it spans a wide range of crime types and therefore raises different considerations depending on the nature of the information sought. 

In relation to any information concerning cases linked to 3D‑printed firearms, the force can neither confirm nor deny whether such information is held. Confirming or denying the existence of information in this area would, in itself, reveal information about policing activity and sensitive law‑enforcement matters, which could prejudice the prevention and detection of crime and undermine operational effectiveness. This position is adopted to ensure consistent handling and to avoid information being inferred through comparison of responses. 

In relation to cases involving 3D printers across other crime types, such as theft, fraud, drugs or counterfeiting and if any resulted in a conviction, the force does not record the involvement of 3D printers in a consistent or searchable manner. Identifying whether any such cases exist would require a manual review of large volumes of individual crime and investigation records across multiple systems and years. The time and resources required to undertake this work would be disproportionate, and the force is therefore unable to comply with this element of the request. 

These two positions address different issues raised by the request. Information relating to firearms is withheld due to sensitivity, while information relating to other crime types cannot be identified without disproportionate effort due to the way records are structured. This does not indicate that one category of information is more readily searchable than another, nor does it confirm whether any specific information is held. 

The force has considered whether it can provide advice to assist the applicant. However, given the breadth of the request and the way information is recorded, it is not possible to suggest a refinement that would enable the force to provide a meaningful response without encountering the same issues outlined above. 

Further to the above, North Yorkshire Police neither confirms nor denies whether any information is held by virtue of Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement, Section 23(5) Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters and Section 24(2) – National Security. Please see the exemption explanation below. 

Q3 & Q4. North Yorkshire Police neither confirms nor denies whether any information is held by virtue of Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement, Section 23(5) Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters and Section 24(2) – National Security. Please see the exemption explanation below. 

Exemption Explanation 

Section 31 and 24 are prejudice-based qualified exemptions and there is a requirement to articulate the harm as well as carrying out a public interest test. 

Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest. Confirming or denying the existence of whether any information is held would contravene the constrictions laid out within Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information applied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies. 

Evidence of Harm 

Confirmation or denial that information is held would identify local‑level policing activity relating to the investigation, detection, or seizure of 3D‑printed weapons. This would risk revealing the level of police awareness, intelligence holdings, and operational focus in relation to such weapons within the force area. 

When this request is made to multiple police forces, there is a further and more significant risk. Confirmation or denial by individual forces would allow responses to be compared, enabling a picture to be built of where national and local investigations and operations are taking place, and potentially where they are not. This mapping or “mosaic” effect would undermine the effective delivery of law enforcement by revealing intelligence gaps, operational priorities, or areas of reduced activity in relation to 3D‑printed firearms. 

Such disclosure would compromise the integrity of policing operations by exposing sensitive intelligence relating to the force’s response to emerging weapons threats. This could adversely affect ongoing or future investigations, some of which may be covert, and would reduce the effectiveness of law‑enforcement activity. 

Disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 is considered a disclosure to the world at large. Whilst the motives of the applicant are not questioned, any information released would be equally accessible to criminals, including serious and organised crime groups and individuals involved in terrorist activity. It is widely recognised that such groups monitor FOI disclosures to identify policing capabilities, gaps, and vulnerabilities that may be exploited to further criminal activity. 

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremism, and any information that identifies the focus, scale, or effectiveness of policing activity relating to weapons offences has the potential to place public safety at risk and undermine national security. 

Any information that could be used to infer the level of policing activity, intelligence capability, or operational focus in relation to 3D‑printed firearms would therefore prejudice both local and national law‑enforcement efforts. 

Public Interest Considerations 

Section 24(2) – National Security 

Factors favouring compliance with section 1(1)(a) - There is a public interest in transparency and accountability in relation to policing and national security matters. Disclosure could contribute to public understanding of how threats are managed and how policing resources are deployed to address emerging risks involving weapons. 

Factors against compliance with section 1(1)(a) - There is a very strong public interest in safeguarding national security and protecting the public from harm. Confirming or denying whether information is held would risk undermining counter‑terrorism and serious crime operations by revealing sensitive intelligence, operational focus, or investigative capability. Any such disclosure could be exploited by those seeking to cause harm, increasing the risk to the public and to police officers. 

Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement 

Factors favouring compliance with section 1(1)(a) - There is a general public interest in openness and in increasing awareness of criminal threats involving weapons. Disclosure could, in theory, contribute to public vigilance and the reporting of suspicious activity. 

Factors against compliance with section 1(1)(a) - Confirming or denying whether information is held would prejudice the prevention and detection of crime by revealing law‑enforcement tactics, intelligence focus, or operational priorities. Even limited disclosures can contribute to a cumulative mosaic effect, whereby multiple pieces of information are assembled to reveal sensitive operational detail. This would undermine the effectiveness of policing and increase the risk of harm to the public. 

Balancing Test 

While there is a public interest in transparency, this is outweighed by the strong public interest in protecting national security, preserving the integrity of law‑enforcement operations, and safeguarding the public. Confirming or denying whether information is held would risk revealing sensitive intelligence relating to the policing of weapons offences, including the scale, focus, or effectiveness of operations involving 3D‑printed firearms. 

The cumulative risk created by confirmation or denial, particularly when responses from multiple forces are compared, is significant. Any such disclosure would contribute to an intelligence picture that could be exploited by criminals or terrorists. 

On balance, the public interest favours maintaining neither confirm nor deny position. No inference can be drawn from this response as to whether information is held or not held. 

Please note that systems used for recording information are not generic, nor are the procedures used locally in capturing the data.  It should be noted therefore that this force’s response to your questions should not be used for comparison purposes with any other responses you may receive.